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This chapter appraises the concept of Ecological Security. The treatment of 
environmental questions as matters of security has grown over the last half century— 
both in theory and practice—but has also proved contentious. Firstly, environmental 
“securitization” is anathema to the traditional realist view that non-military issues do 
not warrant such treatment and, secondly, it is resisted by most ecologists through fears 
that this may prompt the inappropriate militarization of such concerns. The critical or 
human security rationale that the millions of deaths from pollution are, in themselves, 
enough to merit emergency treatment has subsequently suffered by being unwelcomed 
by a large proportion of both the conservatives and the radicals in international 
environmental politics.   
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Introduction 
The treatment of questions of environmental change as matters of security has evolved over 
the last half century—both in theory and practice—but this has also proved contentious on two 
levels. Firstly, environmental “securitization” is anathema to the traditional realist view that 
non-military issues do not warrant such treatment and, secondly, it is resisted by most 
Ecologists through fears that this may prompt the inappropriate militarization of such concerns. 
Securitization, of course, need not mean militarization, but the critical or human security 
rationale—that the annual millions of deaths from pollution, climate change, or ozone depletion 
are enough to merit emergency treatment—has suffered by being unwelcomed by a large 
proportion of both the conservatives and the radicals in international environmental politics.   
Ecological Securitization in Theory 
Whilst it was post-Cold War optimism that encouraged the securitization of environmental 
problems, such an approach was being articulated as far back as the early 1970s in line with 
increased appreciation of the depletion of the Earth’s resources. The Liberal arch critic of 
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realism, Richard Falk, in This Endangered Planet (1971), articulated that “We need to revamp 
our entire concept of ‘national security’ and ‘economic growth’ if we are to solve the problems 
of environmental decay.”1 In a similar vein, the Sprouts’ Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth 
called on governments and academics to focus on global as opposed to national security 
because of the scale of threat posed by resource scarcity and overpopulation.2 Going back 
further still, Osborn, in 1948, opined that resource scarcity could be a cause of war nearly half 
a century before this notion came to be popularized; “ … one of the principal causes of the 
aggressive attitudes of individual nations and of much of the present discord among groups of 
nations is traceable to diminishing productive land and to increasing population pressures.”2 
Written before the Cold War had fully set in place, this highlights just how that conflict came 
to dominate the security agenda in the second half of the twentieth century, stifling other 
concerns. 
State Securitization 
Towards the end of the Cold War, ecological securitization began to permeate the political 
mainstream and even found the ear of a superpower when a landmark article by U.S. diplomat 
Jessica Mathews for Foreign Affairs highlighted the need to give much greater political 
attention to newly-apparent threats posed by environmental problems. Mathews, a former 
member of the U.S. government’s National Security Council, followed the line of reasoning of 
Osborn, Falk, and the Sprouts but in a more state-centered, realist analysis. In addition to 
calling for greater consideration to be given in foreign policy to the effects of resource depletion 
on the political stability of poorer states, Mathews argued that environmental problems with 
global ramifications, such as ozone depletion, climate change, and deforestation, should 
become issues of state security because they were the underlying cause of regional instability.4 
Though less heralded, four years earlier legendary U.S. diplomat George Kennan, in the same 
journal, similarly had argued that the world faced “two unprecedented and supreme dangers,” 
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which were nuclear war and “the devastating effect of modern industrialization and 
overpopulation on the world’s natural resources.”5 
 From these seeds sewn by Kennan and Mathews in the 1980s, a new strand of enquiry 
in international relations (IR) emerged in the post-Cold War era, positing that heightened 
competition for resources would increasingly be a cause of war, particularly in the developing 
world. Canadian academic Homer-Dixon and U.S. journalist Kaplan were at the forefront of 
this area of study,6 the former stating “Environmental scarcities are already contributing to 
violent conflicts in many parts of the world. These conflicts are probably the early signs of an 
upsurge of violence in the coming decades that will be induced or aggravated by scarcity.”7 
Around the same time that the Homer-Dixon / Kaplan thesis was emerging increased 
competition for that most precious of all resources heralded a similar and significant “water 
wars” literature highlighting how arid regions, such as the Middle East, could increasingly see 
access to water used as a weapon.8 Many others have come to link scarcity with war and a 
subsequent strand of the resource war literature has emerged specifically in relation to climate 
change. Dupont and Pearman, for example, argue that a warming world has increased the 
likelihood of conflict in five key ways: resource scarcity; land being rendered uninhabitable 
due either to water scarcity or inundation; the effects of disasters and disease; greater refugee 
movements; and an increased scramble for remaining resource sources.9 In line with this an 
empirical study by Columbia University, similar in style to the Homer-Dixon led research, 
found that countries affected by the El Niño–Southern Oscillation extreme weather 
phenomenon between 1950 and 2005 were twice as likely to experience major civil or 
international conflict (i.e., those with at least twenty-five fatalities) as those not. Cases in point 
highlighted in the study included the fact that El Niño struck Peru in 1982, in the same year as 
the Shining Path insurgency took off, and that civil wars in Sudan had flared up in parallel with 
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the emergence of extreme weather conditions. The study concluded starkly “when crops fail 
people may take up a gun simply to make a living.”10 
Human Securitization  
Going beyond this “widened security” realism of securitizing environmental issues where 
national interests are seen to be invoked are critical and human security approaches focusing 
on the threats environmental change poses to people, rather than states. Among the clearest 
cases of how environmental change can invoke human security are the threats posed by ozone 
depletion, climate change, and other forms of atmospheric pollution. The human cost of ozone 
depletion by the accumulation of chloro-fluro-carbons in the upper atmosphere—in 
exacerbating the threat posed by cataracts and skin cancer—became apparent towards the close 
of the Cold War and was key to propelling environmental change much higher up the 
international political agenda than seen before (and probably since) in the form of the 
successful 1985 Vienna Convention regime. With climate change the implications of the 
artificial acceleration of the greenhouse effect in the Earth’s atmosphere are various but include 
increased desertification, a raising of sea levels due to the polar ice caps melting, more extreme 
weather events and the spread of the range of tropical diseases all carrying significant threats 
to human life in various forms. The World Health Organization suggests that around 150,000 
deaths a year since the early 1970s can be attributed to the gradual rise in temperatures across 
the world.11 Aside from these global-scale pollution threats, more general contamination by 
smog, smoke, and long-range contamination of the air and water by pollutants also claim over 
seven million lives a year.12  
 Set against these annual millions of pollution casualties, war, and terrorism represent 
relatively minor threats (around 170,000 deaths per year). Since most of these deaths by 
pollution can be avoided by political action (as has happened in most developed states), it can 
be posited that an international political failing has occurred. Hence, for human security 
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advocates, the scale of threats to people posed by environmental change are so far removed 
from the way in which issues are conventionally ordered on the political agenda by states that 
IR theory and international political practice needs to find ways of accommodating them, or 
cease to be truly relevant.  
Ecological Security in Practice 
Designating an issue as a matter of security is, of course, not just a theoretical question but 
carries “real world” significance. Realism is undoubtedly most apparent in real world IR, and 
where the securitization of environmental issues has occurred, it has tended to be of the 
“widened” variety.  
National Environmental Securitization 
Many states have come to take a widened approach to security since the 1990s and the resource 
wars literature was particularly influential on the Clinton Administration in the U.S. Homer-
Dixon is known to have been invited to brief Vice President Al Gore and the State Department 
on several occasions in the early 1990s.13 In 1993, a new government position in the Defense 
Department was created with the Deputy Under Secretary for Environmental Security, and the 
Environmental Task Force set up as part of Washington’s intelligence network. The impact of 
all of this was made explicit in the 1994’s “National Security Strategy,” the US’s annual foreign 
policy manifesto.  
Not all security risks are military in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, 
narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee 
flows also have security implications for both present and long term American policy.14 
 Other instances of governments making the environment the stuff of high politics have 
since emerged in North America and North Europe, most notably in several defense and foreign 
policy statements from Finland, Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK.15 In 2007, Foreign 
Minister Margaret Beckett used the UK’s presidency of the UN Security Council to push 
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through, with some resistance from other members, the first discussion in that arena of on an 
overtly environmental topic. A major influence on this stance was the Stern Report of the 
previous year compiled by a British economist on behalf of the UK government, which 
provided an economic security rationale for prioritizing action on climate change. Stern 
calculated the cost of non-action on climate change as amounting to at the very least 5 percent 
of global GDP for evermore. Set against this, the costs of effective action to curb climate 
change would cost around 1 percent of global GDP per year.16 Perhaps, though, the clearest 
illustration of the environment becoming the stuff of widened security comes from its embrace 
by the cold warriors of NATO: 
Based on a broad definition of security that recognizes the importance of political, 
economic, social and environmental factors, NATO is addressing security challenges 
emanating from the environment. This includes extreme weather conditions, depletion 
of natural resources, pollution and so on—factors that can ultimately lead to disasters, 
regional tensions and violence.17 
 As the NATO statement indicates, securitizing environmental issues in practice has 
tended to be in the traditional national security manner of factoring such concerns into 
calculations of defense needs. Many governments have politicized issues of environmental 
change when there is no obvious military dimension, even trumping anthropocentric interests 
for eco-centric reasons (such as in the restriction of polluting organochlorine pesticides like 
DDT) but few have “securitized” them and treated them as matters of urgent political priority. 
An exception is the low-lying states threatened with literal extinction under the waves of the 
rising oceans. Following the Security Council discussion of climate change two years earlier, 
the UN General Assembly in 2009 took up this theme with a resolution drafted by the 
government of low-lying Nauru called Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications 
(A64/350), calling on all UN agencies to prioritize climate change. While the resolution was 
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unanimously adopted, Nauru—and other similarly threatened island states like Tuvalu, the 
Maldives—are amongst the smallest of small fry in the international political system and few 
of the “big fish” have prioritized climate change to the point of seriously compromising their 
short-term economic interests. 
Merits and Demerits of Ecological Securitization 
Is ecological securitization to be welcomed? The question of whether environmental problems 
merit the politically significant label of “security” is a complex one and highly contested. In 
essence, there are four positions that have evolved: traditional realists reject the coupling 
together of ecology and security either or both because environmental threats are not significant 
enough to merit such a label and because the politics of “security” is about the military defense 
of the state not tackling pollution; security wideners consider that environmental challenges 
can be considered the stuff of security but only if they can be seen to cause wars or threaten 
the sovereignty of states; traditional ecologists resist securitization through concerns that this 
risks invoking inappropriate, militaristic “national security” responses to complex 
environmental problems; human / critical security ecologists, receptive to the ontological and 
epistemological challenges to the conventions of IR that emerged following the end of the Cold 
War, contend that environmental threats can and should be securitized by abandoning the 
traditional preoccupation with the state and the military and facing up to different kinds of 
threats.      
Traditional Realists 
Traditional realists in IR share much common ground with political conservatism and some of 
the resistance to ecological securitization is rooted in the environmental skepticism of sections 
of the political right most prominent today in relation to climate change fears. This skepticism, 
however, pre-dates climate change debates and first crystalized in the 1970s in response to the 
doomsday resource depletion scenarios prompted by global overpopulation concerns that 
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marked the rise of political ecology in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These concerns were 
ultimately overcome by the food supply being expanded to meet demand through the “Green 
Revolution” of agricultural technology transfers from North to South, fuelling the notion that 
environmental problems tend to be exaggerated and can be overcome by human ingenuity. 
Traditional realist resistance to ecological securitization, though, is not just about skepticism 
or denial. Ecological policy may be considered important from this perspective but just not as 
pressing a concern as the military defense of the state, a priority that has not changed and is 
maybe more important than ever in a contemporary world marked by transnational terrorism 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
Security Wideners 
The security widener’s embrace of environmental issues has been influential as a practical 
method of re-ordering foreign policy priorities since the end of the Cold War but does not 
represent a compromise position on ecological securitization and is rejected by the other three 
perspectives for differing reasons. For traditionalists, widening is an unwelcome distraction 
from the still-important priorities of defense (though less of a distraction than the other 
perspectives); for ecologists and human security advocates widening exacerbates rather than 
addresses the general over-emphasis on military matters over environmental threats.  
 Despite its influence the approach of framing environmental scarcity as a military 
security matter has not been without its critics. The empirical evidence linking environmental 
degradation and political conflict is, by Homer-Dixon’s own admission, not straightforward, 
prompting skepticism as to whether other variables are the real causes of conflicts in situations 
where environmental scarcity can be demonstrated. The assumption that changes in the balance 
between resources and people creates political problems is considered unfounded by “resource 
war skeptics.” Critics have reasoned that it is easy to link droughts in Sudan to the Darfur 
conflict but such events are unfortunate facts of life in the Sahel and the responsibility for the 
 9 
bloodshed lay squarely with the Janjaweed insurgents and the Sudanese government that failed 
to stop them.18 Equally, as well as finding correlations, history can also provide plenty of 
evidence of environmental disasters and extreme weather conditions not prompting conflict. 
The devastating dustbowls that struck the US Great Plains in the 1930s did not trigger 
conflict.19 Australia has been as much affected by El Niño as Sudan or Peru but has not been 
struck by civil war for obvious economic and political reasons. The cited cases could suggest 
a correlation between conflict and underdevelopment and a lack of democracy more than with 
environmental scarcity.  
 As well as the evidence of transboundary environmental problems or greater resource 
scarcity prompting war being questionable it can even be suggested that the reverse can be true, 
and the environment can be “used” in the context of peace building. Among the olive branches 
presented to the West in the 1980s by Gorbachev were proposals for environmental cooperation 
in the Arctic (which subsequently happened) and on tackling long-range atmospheric pollution. 
In a more concrete example of peace-building in 1998, the Peru-Ecuador Cordillera de Condor 
“Peace Park” was consciously established by both governments to dampen the long running 
border dispute between the Andean neighbors by consigning a contested mountainous region 
as a zone of conservation. 
Traditional Ecologists 
The rise of widened security—and particularly the resource wars thesis—means that ecological 
securitization for many still invokes a perception of militarization which jars with the pacifistic 
instincts of most ecologists. National securitization may be welcomed in terms of getting 
governments on board and giving environmental issues the spotlight they often deserve but old 
habits die hard and evidence suggests that this does tend to lead to the issues being framed in 
militaristic terms. The discourse of environmental change in venues of intergovernmental “high 
politics” invariably becomes reduced down to the resource wars thesis or the apparent threat 
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posed by a rise in environmental migration. Environmental degradation is deemed important 
because it might be a cause of war and instability rather than because it is a threat to life in 
itself. The UK / UN delegation pushing for the Security Council debate in 2007 cited the 
following security implications of climate change: border disputes due to the melting of ice 
sheets and rising sea levels; increased migration with the “the potential for instability and 
conflict”; conflict over energy supplies; conflict due to scarcity; conflict due to poverty; and 
conflicts related to extreme weather events (UNSC 2007). Hence the UK advocacy of action 
on climate change at the UN Security Council in 2007 was, in fact, as realist as the Chinese 
and South African delegations who led the resistance to this. The British had been won over 
by the resource war thesis of Homer-Dixon and others to believe that mitigating global 
warming was a route to peace and also calculated that it made economic sense given the 
conclusions of the Stern Report they had convened. Compassion for the fate of peoples most 
affected in arid, low lying, or polar regions doubtless played a part in the thinking of the Labour 
government but a clear self-interest was apparent and British permanent membership of the 
Security Council provided a good opportunity to attempt a “tactical securitization” of the issue. 
The Chinese and South Africans, in disputing this securitization move, were not rejecting the 
notion that climate change was an important concern but calculating that it was not in their 
national interests to debate this in the Security Council. The playing of the national security 
card over climate change by some countries is instinctively treated with suspicion by others 
because of what national security is understood to stand for in the discourse of IR all have been 
engaged in over the past century. It invokes a militarization of politics with an aggressive 
interference in the affairs of others or a defensive retreat behind strengthened armed borders, 
neither of which are relevant for the multi-dimensional threats posed by climate change. The 
misgivings of the Chinese and South Africans over debating climate change in the Security 
Council doubtless have something to do with their determination not to have to compromise 
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their economic development but there is some merit in the argument that it is an issue better 
tackled elsewhere. In theory, it is appropriate that climate change be debated at the high table 
of global high politics but the problem with this in practice is that the UN Security Council has 
always been an arena of great power realpolitik. It is the arena where Soviet and US Cold War 
adventurism was ignored and, in the present age, where violations of international law by 
countries like Israel and Syria are still ignored because of their continued sponsorship by 
Washington and Moscow. 
Human and Critical Security Ecologists 
Human and critical security advocates share the ecologist’s misgivings about widened security 
but, nevertheless, support ecological securitization because, for them, the concept is for more 
profound than the resource war thesis. While it has been criticized for its vagueness and has—
in practice—been endorsed in different strengths (such as the “freedom from fear” 
interpretation favored by the Canadian government over recent years which tends not to 
consider non-violent “natural” threats as security matters), human security does have a clear 
referent object: the human. Given the transboundary and global nature of environmental 
problems the human is a more clear-cut reference point for security than the state in this issue 
area. Human security, though, is still somewhat problematic from an ecological perspective 
since this is, by definition, an anthropocentric rather than eco-centric way of framing problems. 
However so long as human security is understood in the context of us being part of a global 
biosphere, the safeguarding of which enhances both human and non-human interests, this need 
not be a problem. Thinking in such ecological terms means that social and economic 
transformations are not treated as distinct from atmospheric or biological developments in terms 
of their consequences. Human security can then be incorporated into the logic of ecological 
security. Appreciating that human phenomena like urbanization or increasing consumption have 
effects in the natural world with implications for human security can heighten awareness of them 
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and so improve the management of the resultant threats. Security threats can be more subtle than 
the rapid emergence of a hole in the ozone layer and the solutions more complex than switching 
from the use of CFC to replacement chemicals (as prompted by the Vienna Convention regime). 
Security politics can, in fact, be about the pro-active management of potential threats rather than 
the sudden, dramatic and reactive strategies that most assume of policy labeled in this way. A 
better appreciation of this complexity could help alleviate these difficulties before they become 
imminent crises, as the evolution of domestic environmental policy in most developed countries 
has come to acknowledge. The traditional practices of IR, though, are much better suited to 
responding to crises rather than tackling long-term, underlying causes of these sources of 
insecurity. Re-orientating these practices to the “longer game” of addressing vulnerability and 
insecurity is actually an aim common to both ecologists and human security advocates.  
Conclusions 
The consideration of environmental issues as matters of security has gathered momentum 
academically and politically but remains highly contested. This is not only a consequence of 
environmental issues being given different levels of priority by different ideological 
perspectives but also a question of appropriateness. Those resisting securitization are not only 
the environmental skeptics but also ecologists alarmed at the apparent coupling of the issue 
area with the politics of national interest and militarism.  
 Where the military assumption can be overcome the national securitization of the 
environment can still lead to inappropriate solutions. Technological quick fixes, reactive 
responses after a crisis and headline grabbing stunts are often more politically attractive than 
the slow, unspectacular politics of tackling underlying causes of vulnerability. Low key, 
gradual solutions, however, are usually what are needed to address insecurities arising from 
environmental change. It was the careful, prolonged work of transnational scientists and civil 
society actors rather than grand government gestures that achieved the international political 
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successes seen in combating ozone depletion, based on the Montreal Protocol of the 1985 
Vienna Convention, which has averted millions of cases of skin cancers and cataracts. Put in 
these terms, this is environmental policy clearly in the cause of human security but putting 
limits on industrial emissions is not what most people think of as the politics of security. 
Enquiry in IR (and particularly security studies) often, rightly, stands accused of being so 
preoccupied with semantics, ontology, and epistemology that matter of life and death are not 
addressed as fully as they deserve to be. However, determining how best to address 
environmental change does necessitate such reflection on what “security” means and how it 
can be optimized. Leaving aside the ever-dwindling gaggle of (chiefly non-academic) 
“environmental skeptics,” a lack of consensus on the precise meaning of “ecological security” 
is hampering political efforts to tackle some of the most urgent threats facing the world today. 
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